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Abstract
The paper looks at South Africa’s complex history and poli-
cies of racism, social separation and control and the impact
that this has had on the nature of migration and refugee pol-
icy. The paper argues that this legacy has resulted in policy
and implementation that is highly racialized, coupled with a
society expressing growing levels of xenophobia.
Some causes and manifestations of xenophobia in South
Africa are explored. It further examines how actions of police
and civil servants can mirror the sentiments of the general
public, further disadvantaging refugees and migrants.
The outcomes of the WCAR are discussed with acknow-
ledgment of the positive gains made for refugees and asylum
seekers. The implications for implementation are debated in
light of the attacks on the USA.
In conclusion, a number of recommendations are made in-
cluding the need for ongoing public awareness strategies, the
value of the WCAR Declarations as lobbying tools, a prag-
matic and democratic policy process and the need to high-
light development concerns in approaches to address these
issues.
Résumé
Cet article examine l’histoire complexe de l’Afrique du Sud
et ses politiques racistes et ségrégationnistes et l’impacte que
cela a eu sur la politique sur l’immigration et les réfugiés.
L’article soutient que ce lourd patrimoine a donné naissance
à une politique et une pratique fortement imprégnées par
des considérations de race ainsi qu’une société qui fait mon-
tre de niveaux croissants de xénophobie.
Sont ensuite explorées certaines causes et certaines mani-
festations de la xénophobie en Afrique du Sud. Puis, l’article
se penche sur la manière dont les actes des forces
policières et des fonctionnaires de l’état peut refléter les
sentiments du grand public, préjudiciant ainsi davan-
tage les réfugiés et les immigrants.
Les résultats de la CMCR (« Conférence mondiale
contre le racisme, la discrimination raciale, la xéno-
phobie et l’intolérance qui y est associée ») sont ex-
aminés et les gains obtenus en faveur des réfugiés et
des demandeurs d’asile sont salués. Les implications
pour l’exécution (du programme d’actions) sont dis-
cutées à la lumière des attaques contre les États Unis.
Pour conclure, l’article propose un certain nombre
de recommandations, dont la nécessité de mettre en
place des stratégies pour garder l’opinion publique
bien informée, la valeur des Déclarations de la CMCR
en tant qu’outils pour le lobbying, un processus
démocratique et pragmatique pour développer des
lignes directrices politiques et la nécessité de mettre en
valeur les enjeux touchant le développement à l’in-
térieur des solutions proposées pour résoudre ces
problèmes.
1.  Introduction
The images we have seen are abominable, horrible.
It’s an assault against human rights.1
T
his was the reaction by the Mozambique Minister
of Labour to a police training video that reached
national and international television, showing
Mozambican migrants being attacked by police officers
and dogs in a “training exercise.” The incident deeply
shocked the conscience of even the most cynical of ob-

servers, not only in the sheer level of the violence portrayed, but
also in the way it rekindled memories of the apartheid-style
police brutality.
While media coverage and public debates on violence and
racism in South Africa are nothing new, debates on migration,
refugees, and xenophobia have only relatively recently hit the
public spotlight, and links between racism and xenophobia are
rarely made. As this article will seek to amplify, the nature of
migration and refugee policy and the manner in which it is
implemented in South Africa is highly racialized, stemming
from the country’s complex history and policies of social
separation and control. Equally, the growing xenophobia in
the country is profoundly characterized by racism and a high
degree of violence.
2. Nature of Migration to South Africa2
Since 1994, the context of migration to South Africa has dra-
matically altered. The democratic government has rapidly em-
braced entry into the global arena, pursuing neo-liberal
economic policies aimed at encouraging the free movement of
international trade and capital. An area of contradiction, how-
ever, is related to the free movement of people, particularly
African unskilled economic migrants (often in the form of
informal sector traders) and refugees.
Contemporary migration to South Africa is characterized
by a number of factors, ranging from individuals taking up
contract labour to work in the country’s huge mining and
agricultural industries to persons seeking protection from
persecution, human rights violations, and war.
Many migrants come from neighbouring Mozambique. In
the past these included refugees fleeing the war in Mozam-
bique,3 braving a collection of horrors, including dangerous
wild animals in Kruger National Park (which borders both
countries) and a fence generating a lethal electric voltage, in
their desperation to avoid border control officials in order to
reach relative safety in neighbouring South Africa.
Nowadays, the reasons for migrating from Mozambique are
related largely to economic factors rather than persecution or
war, although since the maintaining of the Rome Peace Accord
between Renamo and Frelimo in 1992, Mozambique has been
beset with a crippling economy and environmental disasters
generating a “new generation” of forced migrants, not least the
devastating floods that displaced hundreds of thousands in
2000.
Migration to South Africa from other countries is believed
by many to have increased. Media reports on migration
abound with headlines such as, “An Invasion to be Halted,” “6
Million Headed Our  Way,” and “Africa Floods into  Cape
Town.”4 However, the actual numbers of migrants entering
South Africa in recent years continue to be heavily contested,
ranging from conservative estimates of several hundred thou-
sand, to  heavily exaggerated figures  ranging into the
“millions,” supported by “pseudo-scientific” data.5
Whatever the numbers, it is clear that the nature of most
regional migration is “circular,” with migrants express-
ing little wish to remain permanently.6 Furthermore,
while employer demand plays a significant role in stimu-
lating irregular/undocumented cross-border migration,
“enforcement targets employees, not employers.”7
3. Racialized Nature of Migration Policy in
South Africa
Prior to 1994, South Africa was infamous throughout the
world for its racialized policies and seemingly limitless
measures of social control. Migration control in South
Africa was in line with apartheid-era policy and has al-
ways been restrictive and security orientated, with similar
origins as the notorious pass laws, as a cornerstone of the
previous government’s policy of influx control, which
were enforced against black people in South Africa as a
means of controlling domestic migrant labour. The pass
laws were particularly harsh, as is reflected in police arrest
statistics; prior to the abolition of influx control, pass law
offences featured disproportionately high.8
In a sense, influx control was effectively “transferred”
to the borders in the form of the Aliens Control Act, a
compilation of various pieces of immigration legislation,
the latest version coming into force in 1991. South Af-
rica’s policy on entry and residence, including tempo-
rary migration, immigration (permanent residence)
and, until recently, refugee status determination, had
fallen under the Aliens Control Act. The Act was concep-
tualized to primarily exclude the entry of Indians (dur-
ing the early part of the twentieth century), Jews (during
the  Second World  War)  and communists (especially
during the Cold War).
The broad discretion accorded by the Act facilitated
generous entry to anti-communists from Eastern
Europe and immigrants from Western Europe, many of
whom were sympathetic to the nationalist cause. While
this discretion also prevented entry to foreign activists
and journalists, it primarily operated to exclude black
migrants, whose entry was strictly limited to bilateral,
contract-labour treaties between South Africa and
neighbouring states to provide cheap labour, mainly for
the mining and agricultural industries. Once in South
Africa, officially or not, black migrants (predominantly
from Mozambique) fell under the influx control legisla-
tion.
The Act (even in its latest versions) was rooted in the
previous government’s overarching policy of apartheid,
and was thus a policy “rooted in racism” as Peberdy and
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Crush have observed.9 Even Billy Masethla, the Director Gen-
eral for the Department of Home Affairs, concurs and has
described the Aliens Control Act as “draconian” and an
“apartheid dinosaur.”10
Despite tremendous pressure from the international com-
munity, the previous government showed itself to be stub-
bornly resistant to change, reinforcing its control through a
civil service and police force that were:
…always in the front line in the enforcement of apartheid … (and)
ensured that black South Africans were kept in their places in
segregated and inferior institutions.11
The department  designated  to enforce  migration policy
today is the very same that, in the past, was responsible for
enforcing influx control. The “sunset clause,” which was part
of South Africa’s negotiated settlement leading to democracy,
ensured job security for most in the civil service. This has
resulted in a government where those at the top may have
changed, but many of the apartheid era officials (and their
unforgiving attitudes) are still there.
The Lindela Deportation Centre provides stark evidence of
the continued racialized nature of migration policy and im-
plementation in South Africa. This facility faced considerable
scrutiny by the South Africa Human Rights Commission after
an enquiry into a range of human rights abuses;12 one will not
find in it any of the thousands of European tourists who have
overstayed their visas. The facility can hold up to 1,500 de-
tainees, and it has been shown that those being held as sus-
pected undocumented migrants are people whose skins are
darker, clothes more colourful, vaccination marks in different
places; Africans who are unable to speak a local African lan-
guage; and people who have a host of other physical attributes
not deemed “South African” and therefore “illegal.”
There is also current discussion on proposed reception/de-
tention centres for asylum seekers to be located far from urban
centres. Whether these centres would accommodate, for ex-
ample, possible white asylum seekers from Zimbabwe without
condemnation is doubtful.
Policy is therefore not in line with contemporary realities of
modern migration. One reality is that skills are leaving the
country (in the form of mostly white emigrants), while skilled
immigrants often face impossible hurdles. Another reality
(mentioned earlier) is that the majority  of migrants enter
South Africa mainly for the purposes of short-term trading or
employment, but with no intention to remain. A further real-
ity is that a far smaller group of migrants (refugees) are enter-
ing the country seeking protection from political persecution
or war and other disasters. Most forms of these activities are
aimed at survival and, contrary to the aspirations of the Act,
uncontrollable. However, they might be managed in a more
appropriate and pragmatic manner, not least through an
analysis of South Africa’s objective labour needs and an
acknowledgement of the positive contributions informal
sector trade can and does make to South Africa and
Southern African economies.
4. Efforts to Reform13
The first migration policy reform came in 1995, with a
statutory amendment14 to the Aliens Control Act No. 96
of 1991. It was Parliament’s intention to bring the Act
more in line with the country’s new constitution. Before
being amended in 1995, s. 55 of the Act even provided
that no decision of the Department was reviewable by a
court or tribunal, and persons could be held in detention
indefinitely, without judicial review.15 The 1995 Amend-
ment removed this provision and provided that deten-
tion for periods beyond thirty days ought to be subject to
review, although in practice it appeared that this was
being inconsistently applied.16 In short, despite the re-
forms, there were still concerns that the Aliens Control
Act fell far short of constitutional expectations.17 Clearly,
more comprehensive reforms were necessary.
Attempts to overhaul the country’s migration policies
were at one stage pragmatic in their approach and char-
acterized by active civil society involvement, as demon-
strated by the draft Green Paper on International
Migration and Refugees Act. Both documents, appear-
ing in 1997 and end of 1998 respectively, proposed
practical measures to address  the country’s  objective
labour requirements, and incorporated a principled
commitment to human rights. However, this approach
was short-lived, as it become increasingly evident that
the government was to sacrifice this approach in favour
of a more security and control oriented approach.
The White Paper on International Migration, the Im-
migration Bill, and the Regulations to the Refugees Act,
presented in May 1999, February and April 2000 respec-
tively, explicitly condemned racism and xenophobia, yet
they also made it clear where the government ultimately
stood in dealing with migration – a position not dramati-
cally different from the past. The security and control
oriented approach was evident in the focus on deterring
undocumented migrants and “bogus” asylum seekers.18
The policy proposals pursue a strategy overwhelmingly
aimed at punishing19 those responsible for trafficking
and employing foreigners on a permit basis. Further, it
is the drafters’ intention that the enforcement of border
controls rely on the community. In its earlier drafts, it
was proposed that a professional security service be es-
tablished in order to identify and apprehend unwanted
foreigners, although we now understand that this idea
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was resisted by other government agencies. With already high
levels of xenophobia, human rights organizations have raised
concern over the implications of encouraging the community
to act as “whistle-blowers” against suspected undocumented
migrants.
The Aliens Control Act is likely to be repealed this year, and
it is hoped that the last vestiges of the apartheid dinosaur will
finally be buried; however, there is considerable concern
whether the legislation that replaces it will appropriately ad-
dress the country’s migration challenges and increasing levels
of xenophobia.20
5. Asylum Determination Regime: Policy and
Capacity Challenges
Reforming refugee  policy  has  received comparatively more
attention. The Refugee Act was passed in 1998 and entered into
force in April 2000. The development of a workable structure,
however, for administering the country’s asylum determina-
tion regime has been complicated by a number of factors, both
policy and capacity related.
South Africa’s Refugee Act 1998 has its origins in the coun-
try’s Aliens Control Act and, although representing a signifi-
cant departure from the ACA, has in numerous respects failed
to provide adequate due process guarantees to applicants, and
is implemented in an ad hoc manner.21 Capacity-related prob-
lems are largely a consequence of the fact that the issue is still
quite new in South Africa, and that the asylum system has fit
uncomfortably within the country’s immigration system.22
There are  not enough resources  (especially staff, the
majority of whom urgently need training) on hand to
process the steadily increasing numbers of asylum appli-
cations.23
The South African Human Rights Commission and
migration experts, amongst others, have raised serious
concerns about the consistent failure to achieve satisfac-
tory standards of administrative justice.24 This is evident
through unfair delays of applications, racist and dis-
criminatory practices, and inconsistent application of
the law.
While the number of applications received appears to
have stabilized in recent years (Figure 1; note that these
are cumulative statistics) and cannot be regarded as pre-
senting a situation of “mass influx,” as compared with
other countries on the continent, the cumbersome sys-
tem places a heavy burden on those struggling to re-es-
tablish their lives as refugees in South Africa.25
Of particular concern to human rights activists are the
implications of the section 22 Asylum Seeker permit,
issued in terms of the 1998 Refugees Act. Designed to
deter “bogus” asylum claims, the permit removes the
right to work and study for asylum seekers for the 180
days while the claim is being processed.26 In this interim
period, no social assistance is made available and the
common refrain from asylum seekers is, “We are given
a piece of paper from the Department of Home Affairs.
Can we eat this piece of paper?”27
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Figure 1: Applications Received to Date (1995-2001, cumulative)
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With no access to social assistance and removal of the right
to economic participation, asylum seekers find themselves in
an alarming situation of “enforced destitution,” denying them
the ability to survive legally.28 Once refugee status has been
obtained, a number of barriers continue to impede the ability
of refugees to integrate and meaningfully participate in soci-
ety. There is a need for government to reconsider the inhu-
mane restrictions that the section 22 permit imposes on
asylum seekers and to address the issue of refugees and asylum
seekers holistically. This requires commitment, through pol-
icy and information, to provide material assistance and sup-
port for asylum seekers and refugees that extends beyond the
provision of legal protection.29
6. Racism and Xenophobia
On a spring day in September 1998, a horrifying incident took
place on a train between Johannesburg and Pretoria. A mob of
unemployed South Africans demonstrating against the pres-
ence of foreigners in South Africa murdered one Mozambican
and two Senegalese asylum seekers, who were scraping a living
selling sweets to passengers.30 The public’s response, however,
was muted. The victims were black foreigners.
According to Okkoth-Obbo this is an alarming trend visible
in many other African countries:
Xenophobia, hatred and intolerance against foreigners has mush-
roomed in Africa. Once renowned for the generous and hospitable
manner in which it received refugees and foreigners, refugees and
foreigners now often find that they have more to fear from the
ordinary citizens than from agents of the state.31
Xenophobia, although a contested term, is widely
defined as the irrational fear of the unknown, the fear or
hatred of foreigners by nationals against non-nationals.
Xenophobia is largely based on unfounded myths and
stereotypes with foreigners scapegoated for domestic
social and economic problems. In South Africa foreign-
ers are blamed for the high crime rate, the HIV/AIDS
pandemic, the high levels of unemployment, and the
lack of social services. It would appear that in South
Africa, foreigners and refugees fear both the ordinary
citizens and agents of the state.
Xenophobia is manifested in a number of ways rang-
ing from derogatory terms to unacceptable levels of
violence against foreigners. Asylum seekers and refugees
are in many ways particularly vulnerable since they are
more obviously “distinguishable” from South Africans
and furthermore are more “visible” because of their legal
status.
There are a number of arguments/hypotheses as to
why xenophobia is manifesting and growing in South
Africa. Some will be mentioned here, bearing in mind
that more comprehensive research is needed in this field.
South Africa’s isolation
The xenophobic violence that South Africa is experienc-
ing is in many ways a legacy of the country’s racist history.
It is also the product of a futile, isolationist policy de-
signed to intimidate and control foreigners. South Af-
rica’s past exclusion from the international community
has resulted in the inability to tolerate and accommodate
difference. Hobsbawm describes xenophobia “as the
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Table 1
Refugee Applications in South Africa: 1995–2001 (Cumulative Statistics)
Source Dated Received Approved “Refused”* Outstanding
UNHCR (State of the World’s Refugees) May 1995 3.644 383 517 2.744
DHA / UNHCR (recorded figures) June 1996 16.967 1.915 5.649 9.403
DHA / UNHCR (recorded figures) Aug. 1997 32.510 4.002 6.118 22.390
DHA ** Nov. 1998 47.612 7.927 19.031 20.654
DHA / UNHCR (recorded figures) June 1999 54.759 8.504 25.020 21.235
DHA / UNHCR (recorded figures) Apr. 2000 60.278 15.006 29.219 16.053
DHA / UNHCR (recorded figures) June 2000 60.515 15.116 29.899 15.500
DHA / UNHCR (recorded figures) Apr. 2001 64.341 17.198 34.184 12.959
* “Refused” includes: Rejected, cancelled, expired, withdrawn and manifestly unfounded applications
** Speech by Deputy Minister of Home Affairs to Parliament, November 5, 1998

product of social transition, as a defence against the anxiety
induced by ‘the unknown’.”32
Economic deprivation and scapegoating
Exploitative economic policies and continued wars and conflict
have had a negative effect on the social and economic develop-
ment of Africa with major implications for migration. Central
to xenophobic tensions is the competition for scarce resources
and the perception that non-nationals pose a significant threat
in terms of limited opportunities and resources.33 Added to this
is the seemingly endless duration of conflicts in Africa leading
to compassion fatigue and declined empathy in assisting refu-
gees and asylum seekers. Some South Africans view the South
African liberation struggle as a real struggle compared with
ethnic and religious conflicts elsewhere on the continent.
When confronted with xenophobic violence, many whites
do not perceive this issue as affecting their own security di-
rectly, and so tend to ignore it. This kind of response is
reminiscent of the previous government’s declarations de-
scribing most of the violence in the country as being “black on
black.” On the other hand, there are white South Africans
claiming, in an odd kind of solidarity, that the government
should put South Africans first, blaming foreigners for the
country’s social and economic ills – an argument that also
provides a convenient distraction from discussions on eco-
nomic redistribution.
Democracy, The Nation and ‘Others’
South Africa, understandably, is in the process of constructing
a national identity out of a violent and fractured past, contested
between disparate cultures and communities. In this construc-
tion, Africa features prominently via the current South African
President’s African Renaissance ideal. These two processes,
nation-building and Africa-building, operate simultaneously;
but they are producing tensions and contradictions on the
ground.34
In this new political landscape, the government is under
pressure to deliver to a voting electorate. Voting populations
have a growing sense of their rights and entitlements, thus
laying claim to the limited socio-economic resources available.
If foreigners are perceived as a threat to the development of
the nation, it is easier for government departments, particu-
larly with regard to migration policy, to pander to populist
sentiments rather than be unequivocal in their commitment
to human rights. Billy Masethla, the Director General of the
Department of Home Affairs, concedes that the department
“finds itself increasingly locked between, on the one hand,
human rights considerations on the handling of these foreign-
ers and, on the other, growing xenophobic attitudes towards
them among South Africans.”35
Xenophobia and Racism
As mentioned previously, South Africa has only recently
emerged from a violent, racially divided past. According
to Okkoth-Obbo, xenophobia typifies a society in contra-
diction with itself: “The point is that xenophobes dem-
onstrate resistance to diversity not only of external origin,
but internally as well.”36
Crucial in constructing a nation is a common destiny.
Governments trying to unite an internally fractured rac-
ist society may embark on a nation-building project that
constructs the “insiders” as the nationals and the “out-
siders” as the non-nationals. Yuval-Davis argues that the
common destiny needs to be enhanced through the
construction of a “symbolic border guard,” the creation
of boundaries dividing the world into “us” and “them.”37
Research in South Africa has shown that xenophobic
attitudes are held at all levels of society across race, class,
and gender divides.38
Lack of Knowledge
If knowledge is power, it is clear why South Africans and
foreigners are disempowered in contemporary South Af-
rica. Basic information—Who is a refugee? Who is a
foreigner? Where do “they” come from? What are “they”’
doing here? What are their rights in South Africa?—are
not known, not only by the average South African, but
also by key civil servants and law enforcement officials.
7. Institutionalized Racism and Xenophobia
There is a strong sensitivity in South Africa to claims of
being racist; reactions are often hostile and deeply polar-
ized. However, the screening of the police training video
on national television was so utterly shocking that it did
manage to stimulate some debate as to whether the inci-
dent smacked of racism, or (gruesome as it was) was just
the latest in a series of anti-foreigner attacks.
Joyce Tlou, lawyer and national coordinator of the
National  Consortium on  Refugee  Affairs (NCRA) in
South Africa, was unequivocal in her response: “black
people felt very strongly that the issue is not about dogs
and brutality but racism and that this is what should be
addressed.” The South African Human Rights Commis-
sion, in a press release on the incident, highlighted the
links between racism and xenophobia:
The fact that the victims were black, foreign and may
have been here without the proper authorisation obvi-
ously contributed to the police thinking that no matter
what pain they inflicted, they would not be held account-
able. There is a direct link between the alarming degree
of xenophobia and racism prevailing in our society and
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the existence of such beliefs in people who are entrusted with
the job of upholding the law.39
Like violence in general, police brutality is an enduring
problem in South Africa. The incident described at the begin-
ning of this article, disturbing as it was, merely represents the
tip of the iceberg, the latest in a flood of allegations that has
overwhelmed the capacity of the South African Independent
Complaints Directorate (ICD) monitoring the activities of the
police in South Africa. The link between the brutality of the
police and racism is also well established, the victims being
almost invariably black and often treated in a racist manner,
as both Tlou and international  observers such  as Human
Rights Watch40 and Amnesty International41 have observed. It
is therefore no coincidence that the victims of “xenophobic”
attacks are, almost invariably, black people from African
countries.
In March 2000, an exceptionally xenophobic exercise was
undertaken by the South Africa Police Service (SAPS). Called
Operation Crackdown, it propounded to be an anti-crime
blitz with expressed goals to “thoroughly ventilate all criminal
elements and illegal immigrants.”42 Targeting areas with large
migrant communities such as Hillbrow, the Operation led to
countless allegations of human rights abuses, including genu-
ine refugee papers being destroyed and refugees being herded
up and sent to the Lindela Deportation Camp.
Further incidences have sparked outrage within the South
African community. On March 12, 2001, Sylvia Manda, a
South African teacher in Hillbrow, was arrested, assaulted, and
detained for several hours on suspicion of being an undocu-
mented immigrant. When the police captain, Bongani Dube,
was asked to elaborate on what grounds they suspected her of
being an illegal immigrant [sic], Dube replied, “complexion,
facial appearance, accent and her style of dressing.”43 The case
of Sylvia Manda is not unique, with other darker-skinned
South Africans reporting similar incidences. Operation Crack-
down and cases such as that of Sylvia Manda have a further
implication in reinforcing existing stereotypes of foreigners
and criminality.
Another, less publicized, implication is the cost of human
rights violations to the South African taxpayer: Sylvia Manda
and many of the victims of Operation Crackdown have insti-
tuted civil claims against the police running into millions of
rands.
Responsibility for attacks and hostility against foreigners
does not lie on the doorstep of the police alone, however.
Indeed, in democracies the world over, police and civil ser-
vants often mirror the sentiments of the general public as a
kind of moral justification for their actions, and South Africa
is no exception.
Civil servants provide the hands-on delivery, which is es-
sential to implementation of policy. As the gatekeepers of
access to legal documentation, safety and security, edu-
cation, housing, and a host of other social services, civil
servants are powerful figures in the lives of asylum seek-
ers and refugees. Presently, the conduct of many govern-
ment officials depends largely on individual feelings and
opinions rather than on professional human rights con-
duct.44
Compounded by the lack of a coherent policy, inade-
quate information on the social and economic needs of
refugee and asylum seekers, lack of knowledge by refu-
gees and asylum seekers on their rights of access and,
most especially, the hostility and negative attitudes that
refugees and asylum seekers face when attempting to
access government services, it is not surprising that an
asylum seeker recently protested, “Xenophobia in the
civilian population is almost easier to manage… It is the
institutionalized xenophobia of government officials
that leaves us feeling the most powerless.”45
World Refugee Day, June 20, 2001, was used as an
opportunity to engage government on some of the cru-
cial legal, socio-economic, and safety concerns facing
refugees and asylum seekers. A workshop titled “Refugee
Life in South Africa: Building Partnerships towards Bet-
ter Solutions” was planned as a follow-up to the South
African National Conference on Racism held in Septem-
ber 2000. Article 30 of the South African Millennium
Statement on Racism and Programme of Action states:
Appropriate social assistance for asylum seekers and refu-
gees needs  to be  considered in close co-operation  with
NGOs, which would help in their integration into South
African society and increase their contribution in skills and
expertise towards national development. The Conference
calls for the development of closer co-operation between
government, the National Consortium on Refugee Affairs
and the UNCHR in order to co-ordinate improved services
to asylum seekers and refugees.
The workshop brought together key government de-
partments, NGOs, faith-based organizations, the NCRA,
the Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign, and the UNHCR
to begin deliberations on the policies of asylum and to
consolidate processes needed to holistically address the
grim realities facing refugees and asylum seekers. The
workshop also addressed the barriers that racism and
xenophobia pose in the access to quality services and
integration into the South African society.
Furthermore the South African Police Service (SAPS)
is currently working in partnership with human rights
organizations46 in a series of pilot workshops aimed at
sensitizing the police to the rights of refugees and non-
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nationals and the obligations of SAPS in ensuring their safety
and security.
9. The World Conference against Racism in Durban
The Conference condemns any form of co-operation with South
Africa… the international community is exerting all its efforts
toward the objective of completely isolating the racist regime of
South Africa.47
These were the words of the Declaration and Programme of
Action adopted at the World Conference to Combat Racism
and Racial Discrimination 1983. Indeed almost the entire Dec-
laration of 1983 was focussed on outrage against apartheid. It
was therefore not subtle irony, but rather a continuation of the
country’s globally celebrated democracy, that brought the next
World Conference to the “rainbow nation” of South Africa.
The World Conference Against Racism (WCAR),48 accom-
panied by a parallel NGO Forum, was undoubtedly one of the
most significant human rights events to take place at an inter-
national level in the last decade. It is perhaps for this reason
alone that the number of items on the meeting’s agenda
proved to be so considerable, if not overwhelming, each item
certainly worthy of a separate conference on its own. The
significant media attention during the early stages of the con-
ference was a positive illustration of the increased awareness
of human rights issues since the last meeting, which took place
in 1983. On the other hand, the large agenda was also a sad
reflection that there continues to be a great deal of human
rights abuse taking place around the world as well as a deep-
ening dissatisfaction that past abuses remain unresolved.
It was unfortunate that considerable attention on the part
of NGOs and the media focussed overwhelmingly on issues at
the NGO Forum dealing with the situation in Israel / Palestine.
The reactionary response by the United States and Israel of
withdrawing their delegations in response to an NGO-pro-
duced Draft Declaration (soon followed by a drastic reduction
in the delegations of European countries) was  even  more
disappointing. These events had the impact of drawing atten-
tion away from the many other areas being positively ad-
dressed at WCAR, not least issues pertaining to the treatment
of migrants, migrant workers, and refugees.
With regard to refugees and asylum seekers, it is interesting
to note that in the 1983 Declaration refugees are largely re-
ferred to in the context of the anti-apartheid liberation strug-
gle and those fleeing the racist South African regime of the day.
The NGO document and Government Declaration of 2001
reflect widely applicable gains for migrants in particular, but
also for refugees. The NGO document attempts to address the
conference focus on racism by providing a specific acknow-
ledgement of xenophobia as a particular form of discrimina-
tion and intolerance experienced by people presumed to
be foreign nationals.49 Furthermore, detailed recom-
mendations call for renewed commitment to equitable
and non-discriminatory assistance for refugees in vari-
ous regions of the world.
In the Final Declaration and Program of Action,50
there are many references to the protection of migrants,
migrant workers, and refugees. Of particular note is
paragraph 16 of the Final Declaration:
16. We recognize that xenophobia against non-nationals,
particularly migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, consti-
tutes one of the main sources of contemporary racism and
that human rights violations against members of such
groups occur widely in the context of discriminatory, xeno-
phobic and racist practices
Of note to South African NGOs participating at the
NGO Forum and the WCAR was the active international
migrant caucus concentrating largely on the plight of
migrant workers. The preparation and organization of
the caucus highlighted the weaknesses of both the Afri-
can region and the value of a focussed, internationally
integrated caucus lobbying for refugees and asylum
seekers in particular. Considering the massive refugee
crisis facing the continent, the lack of participation by
African NGOs in the meetings dealing with refugees and
asylum seekers raised a number of questions about a lack
of commitment to the issue, limited resources for or-
ganizations working in the field, and levels of disempow-
erment of the refugee community themselves to actively
represent their issues at a forum of this nature. Gains
made at the conference were largely due to a handful of
committed activists who made particularly useful con-
tributions.51
It is of course too early to predict with any certainty
whether the principles contained in the “Durban Decla-
ration” will translate into progressive, concrete actions
on the part of states to address xenophobia and racist
practices towards foreigners, though it is difficult to feel
positive about the future. Our fear is that, on one hand,
a true commitment to these principles on the part of
states will prove to be increasingly elusive, as tradition-
ally has been the case.
The fact that powerful states withdrew or drastically
reduced the strength of their delegations early on in the
conference was a grim message implying a serious lack
of state commitment to these issues. On the other hand,
progressive language on the rights of migrants and for-
eigners that was incorporated into the Declaration pro-
vides a potentially powerful tool for future advocacy.
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The challenge is now on the part of the UN, NGOs, and
progressively minded governments to advocate these princi-
ples in positive, creative ways. In South Africa, there is a small
but vocal group including the South African Human Rights
Commission, NGOs, and CBOs advocating for the rights of
refugees in South Africa. In light of the above-mentioned
observation, however, there is a need to lobby at regional and
continental levels to ensure that the WCAR documents assist
in halting the current erosion of refugee rights in the region
and the continent.
10. Conclusions
Apportioning blame to foreigners for the considerable socio-
economic problems of South Africa has perhaps been the most
visible feature in the migration debate in South Africa, with very
little put forward in the way of concrete, rights-regarding solu-
tions. Advocacy organizations on behalf of foreigners have been
small in number, facing seemingly insurmountable obstacles in
their efforts to motivate for a rational policy and to change
attitudes. Returning to a principled and pragmatic approach to
migration policy, as advocated  by  the  South  African Draft
Green Paper on International Migration and partly reflected in
the Refugees Act, could be a way of reaffirming the country’s
commitment to social and economic development and human
rights, and acknowledging the realities of why people move.
But whatever the change in policy may be, it is clear that it
will have to be accompanied by a major change in attitude on
the part of society and officials. Although the Roll Back Xeno-
phobia Campaign52 has made a number of significant gains in
public awareness and education targeting civil servants, the
police, and the general public, it will, however, take the overt
support and commitment of senior government and political
leaders to make a concerted impact at changing attitudes and
mindsets.
Anti-xenophobia awareness campaigns aimed at changing
society’s  perceptions need to  be adequately resourced and
developed, supported as well by expanding the targeted train-
ing of police officers, immigration officers, and civil servants.
Attitudes need to be changed at their core, and racism in
particular needs to be addressed at a fundamental level.
The experiences of other countries might be useful in this
regard. As one police officer from the Netherlands (who par-
ticipated in a training program in South Africa) has noted:
police cultures have great similarities in democracies all over the
world. It is a culture that often transcends national boundaries, and
a proven way of addressing negative attitudes within the police is
to improve professionalism in the force.53
In this context, promoting the exchange of officials between
two countries dealing with the reception of migrants, and
supporting collaborative training, might prove to be of
great benefit.54 International experience should be used
for examples of best practices, without ignoring the spe-
cific nature of migration in South Africa.
A new migration policy in South Africa should repre-
sent a clean break from the country’s racist past, focuss-
ing more on objective realities of the country’s urgent
labour requirements in the context of a human-rights-
regarding society (as proposed by the Green Paper), and
less on issues of security. International experience has
demonstrated the overwhelming failure and cost of
mechanisms aimed at control, and the great value of
those aimed at stimulating development.
Changing attitudes and the implementation of policy
is a much greater task. In our view, there must first be an
honest assessment and acknowledgement of the causes
of racist, xenophobic violence perpetrated against for-
eigners and the implications thereof.
This year (2001), with the international community
gathering in Durban, South Africa, for the United Na-
tions-sponsored International Conference on  Racism
and Xenophobia, provided an ideal opportunity for re-
examining these issues, although as mentioned above it
is unclear to what extent the progressive principles and
program of action contained in the final declaration will
translate into concrete results.
The signs are that this could prove to be a very difficult
task indeed, further worsened by the attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, in the United States.55 Events that have
followed have included numerous, shocking reports of
a “backlash” against foreigners, particularly of Arabic
and South Asian backgrounds, and nationals of Arabic
and South Asian descent, including verbal and physical
attacks and the desecration of mosques and businesses.
Finally, it has for some time been clear that govern-
ments hosting refugees and migrants are seeking to im-
pose ever more restrictive policies regarding entry. The
United States, which has traditionally pursued a policy
of routinely detaining asylum seekers who spontane-
ously arrive and seek asylum, is now introducing even
stronger mechanisms in regard to detention, measures
to introduce tougher measures against undocumented
arrivals,56 and counter-terrorism measures that have
(positively) been described as “draconian” by U.S. Presi-
dent Bush. While many of Australia’s refugee activists
were lobbying at the NGO forum, the Australian govern-
ment was refusing Afghan asylum seekers entry to their
ports. The situation for Afghan refugees has sub-
sequently worsened with the closing of neighbouring
borders in the wake of the threatened U.S. retaliation.
These approaches to those seeking asylum highlight the
Volume 20 Refuge Number 1

need for intensified, sympathetic, and sophisticated lobbying
by human rights activists to reclaim and reaffirm the principles
of the fledgling WCAR commitments.
Statements coming from the South African government,
however, give us greater reason for hope. The government not
only made considerable effort to try to convince governments
not to withdraw their delegations from the WCAR, but in
response to the events of September 11, the South African
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued statements calling for
restraint.57 It is hoped that these same sentiments will be
shared by the Ministry of Home Affairs (responsible for im-
migration and refugees) as well as the police and the South
African public.
Relevant Web Links:
• Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign: <www.sahrc.org.za> and
<www.lhr.org.za/rollback/rollback.htm>
• Information on the National Consortium on Refugee Affairs:
<www.lhr.org.za/rollback/ncrainfo.htm>
• South African HumanRights Commission: <www.sahrc.org.za>
• Lawyers for Human Rights Refugee Rights Project:
<www.lhr.org.za/refugee/refugeenav.htm>
• Southern African Migration Project: <www.queensu.ca/samp>
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